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Abstract 
Recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage firms highlight 
substantial incentive problems in commercial and reinsurance markets where intermediation takes 
place. We show that in markets with informed as well as uninformed consumers and heterogeneous 
risk profiles intermediation has the potential to improve social welfare. However, since intermediation 
reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit collusion are higher compared to markets without 
intermediation. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the 
issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides explanations for the counterintuitive 
observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. The rationale for the latter 
is the fact that a fee paid by uninformed consumers limits the insurers’ ability to extract rents from 
informed consumers. 
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JEL Classification: D83; G22; J33; L1 
  11. Introduction 
Middlemen play an important role in markets with considerable market imperfections. 
Essentially, as pointed out by YAVAS [1994] there are two different types of intermediaries 
that facilitate market transactions. Market makers, on the one hand, such as stock market 
specialists, act on their own account by buying a certain good from a seller at a bid price and 
reselling it to buyers at an ask price. On the other hand, matchmakers, like real estate brokers, 
simply match sellers and buyers without being an active trading party. As studied by 
BIGLAISER [1993], middlemen are usually experts with superior information about market 
conditions and product characteristics. Hence, they may enhance market efficiency by 
providing additional consulting services for market participants. 
In insurance markets brokers act mainly as matchmakers and offer supplementary 
services for both policyholders and insurance companies. The social profitability of 
intermediation depends on the market environment in which transactions take place. In non-
commercial insurance markets a broker primarily is concerned with analyzing the insured’s 
risk profile. Typically, given the consumer’s individual need for coverage, the matching 
product could be purchased from a variety of carriers. 
In this paper we will concentrate on commercial insurance markets and reinsurance 
markets, where risk profiles are complex and coverage solutions tend to be more 
individualized. In these markets the majority of consumers might be able to assess their own 
needs quite accurately. However, because of capacity limits and product differentiation, the 
broker’s function of finding a matching insurer becomes more important. The broker’s 
comparative advantage in this context is the superior market overview. For instance, brokers 
can determine the necessary coverage and seek for appropriate offers among different carriers. 
In addition, brokers typically assume other functions such as the administration of the policy 
and the transfer of payments between the two parties. Subsequently, it is not very surprising 
  2that brokers are important intermediaries particularly in the context of commercial property 
and liability insurance as well as in reinsurance. 
However, recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage 
firms highlight substantial incentives for collusion in commercial and reinsurance markets 
with intermediation. In one, rather prominent, case collusion between an American insurance 
broker and several insurance companies took place.
1 A coalition of commercial insurance 
companies agreed to pay “contingent commissions” for brokers, and in return, the receiving 
brokers presented their customers high premium pseudo-offers from other coalition members. 
In another case, German commercial insurance companies established a cartel in order to 
decrease price competition and to enforce higher premiums as a reorganization measure. They 
particularly agreed to unify terms and conditions and exerted pressure on companies that tried 
to deviate from the cartel, by excluding them from certain pooling solutions.
2
Given these examples of collusive behavior in insurance markets where intermediation 
plays a major role, this paper tackles the following three important questions. First of all, why 
is collusive behavior such a common phenomenon in insurance markets with intermediation? 
Secondly, what is the specific role of a broker in this context? And thirdly, to what extent 
does the broker’s compensation affect pricing and collusive behavior of insurance companies? 
In the spirit of VARIAN [1980] and SCHULTZ [2004, 2005], this paper considers a 
Hotelling market with differentiated products, where some consumers are unaware of their 
own risk profile and market prices. In a situation without intermediation uninformed 
consumers match randomly with one of two suppliers which leads to a significant welfare 
loss. In this situation, price competition is not very intensive and suppliers make strictly 
positive profits. When the costs for an individual risk analysis are sufficiently low, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., RUQUET, M. AND D. HAYS [2004], “Spitzer Sues Marsh For Payoffs; 2 AIG Executives Plead Guilty”, 
National Underwriter / Property & Casualty Risk & Benefits 108: 6 – 10. 
2 See, BUNDESKARTELLAMT [2005], “Bundeskartellamt verhängt 130 Mio. Euro Bußgeld gegen Industrie-
versicherer,“ Press release, March 23. 
  3intermediation is potentially beneficial from a social planner’s point of view (see for instance 
BAYE AND COSIMANO [1989] or COSIMANO [1996]). However, the increase of market 
transparency on the consumer side intensifies competition between suppliers and lowers their 
profits. Therefore, markets with intermediation or high transparency are susceptible to 
collusion (see, e.g., SCHULTZ [2005]). As a further consequence, the suppliers’ cartel has 
reasonable incentives to include brokers into their coalition. Moreover, incentives for 
collusion can affect the way intermediaries are compensated. Usually two remuneration 
regimes compete with each other: commission and fee-for-advice systems.
3
In order to answer the questions identified above we use a two-step approach: Firstly, 
as a starting point, we highlight the potential profitability of insurance intermediation in a 
Hotelling insurance market with uninformed consumers in either remuneration system. 
Secondly, we analyze incentives for collusive behavior and evaluate the specific role of 
insurance brokers within the three-tier relationship between policyholders, insurance brokers 
and insurance companies. In this respect, we give a theoretical explanation of why a 
commission system, which is weakly preferable from an insurer’s point of view, prevails in 
real insurance markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model framework 
is introduced and a situation without intermediation is analyzed. The potential advantages of 
intermediation without collusion are considered in section 3. Consequently, in section 4, we 
regard the possibility of collusion between suppliers and evaluate the specific role of brokers 
in markets with uninformed consumers. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 For an analysis of these systems in life insurance markets with more than one intermediary and its impact on 
advice quality see for example GRAVELLE [1994]. 
  42. Model without intermediation 
The purpose of this section is to characterize the market result without intermediation and to 
determine the welfare loss which is due to the presence of uninformed consumers in the 
insurance market. Following D’ASPREMONT ET AL. [1979], HOTELLING [1929] and SCHULTZ 
[2004], we consider an insurance market with risk neutral consumers
4 that have 
heterogeneous preferences. A consumer is located at  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ x , which represents her risk 
profile
5. For simplicity reasons, each individual risk profile is assumed to be associated with 
the same marginal cost (expected loss)  . A consumer’s willingness to pay for an 
insurance policy is  , and she purchases one insurance policy at most. There are two 
insurance companies,  , which are located at the two extremes of the city. Company   
offers a policy at   and company 1 at 
0 > c
0 > v
1 , 0 = j 0
0 = x 1 = x . 
Since insurance is a rather complex product, it is assumed that only a fraction φ  of 
consumers is informed about their precise risk profile or, technically, their location in the 
interval   and the firms’ “location”. (Please note again, that a firm’s relative position 
represents its product’s fit, given the consumer’s profile.) Informed and uninformed 
consumers are uniformly distributed.  
[ 1 , 0 ]
Consumers face a disutility from purchasing an imperfectly matching insurance 
product. If insurance companies charge premiums   and  , consumer  0 p 1 p x receives a net 
utility   from buying a policy from insurer 0 and  tx p v − − 0 ( ) x t p v − − − 1 1  from buying a 
policy from insurer 1, where   measures the marginal disutility of a mismatch 0 > t
6. An 
informed consumer is indifferent between buying from company   and 1 if she is located at  0
                                                 
4 For simplicity reasons consumers are assumed to be risk neutral, since we are not interested in any risk 
allocation problems, and the standard assumption of risk aversion does not change our qualitative results. 
5 “Risk profile” here refers to the consumer’s individual preferences concerning the insurance product 
characteristics. 
6 If the consumer is neither located in   nor in  0 = x 1 = x , she is not able to buy a perfectly matching product. 
This leads to a difference between her most preferred product characteristics and those offered. The resulting 
disutility of mismatch is measured by the distance between the consumer’s location x and the chosen product, 










≡ = . (1) 
Uninformed consumers only form expectations   regarding their actual own risk 
profile x. Their respective net utility of buying insurance coverage is   if coverage 
is purchased from company 0 and 
e x
e tx p v − − 0
( )
e x t p v − − − 1 1  if consumers buy from insurer 1. Since 
we concentrate on symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies
7 where both insurance 
companies set the same price and serve both groups of consumers, uninformed consumers 
with rational expectations  2 1 =
e x  are ex ante indifferent between both firms. Consequently, 
they randomly choose their insurance carrier. Subsequently, we assume that each insurance 
company attracts half of the uninformed consumers. 
In order to simplify our analysis, the willingness to pay for consumers v, is assumed to 
be 
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and firm 1’s respective demand is given by  ( ) ( ) 0 1 0 1 0 1 , 1 , p p D p p D − = . Given (3) the profit 
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7 For further analyses concerning mixed strategy equilibria and the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium see, 
e.g., SCHULTZ [2005] and VARIAN [1980].  
8 The opposite case  ( ) [ ]t c v φ φ 2 / 2+ + <  is not considered, since without intermediation it would lead to separated 
monopolistic markets, in which both firms can set their prices independently. 
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4 * t c v ui . (9) 
Comparing (8) and (9) highlights the welfare loss due to the random matching of 
insurance companies and uninformed consumers. Since the latter have no information about 
their own location, they choose their respective insurance company randomly. Thus, from a 
social planner’s point of view, half of the uninformed consumers match with the wrong 
insurance company. This mismatching causes a welfare loss of 













⎛ − − . (10) 
The overall welfare in the economy, given by the weighted sum of ex ante net utility 
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* *
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t c v . (12) 
  7The derived overall welfare without intermediation is the reference for the social profitability 
of intermediation in markets with uninformed consumers. 
 
3. Intermediation without collusion 
In this section a completely non-strategic insurance broker or middleman is incorporated into 
the analysis. We focus on the welfare increasing effect of an honest intermediary who 
exclusively improves the matching process between uninformed consumers and insurance 
companies.  
In the considered situation a middleman can only be valuable, if he has – compared to 
uninformed consumers and insurance companies – access to superior information. To keep 
things as simple as possible, the middleman is assumed to be endowed with an information 
technology that incurs variable cost   and reveals the position  0 > k x of a consumer perfectly. 
Our analysis will be divided into two parts which differ with respect to the payment 
structure between insurance company, broker and consumer. In the first case, the broker is 
compensated directly by the insureds (fee-for-advice system). Particularly, neither 
communication nor monetary transfers between the broker and the insurance company are 
taking place. In this remuneration system, an insurance company cannot distinguish informed 
and initially uninformed consumers, who were informed by a broker.  
In the second case, insurance companies pay the broker (commission system). As the 
broker is compensated for every individual initially uninformed consumer, insurance 
companies are able to distinguish the different types of consumers. 
  8Fee-for-advice system 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the fee-for-advice remuneration system. The 
sequence of the game is as follows: At stage 1 insurance companies simultaneously announce 
their prices  p . Then, at stage 2, the middleman makes a price offer   for an individual risk 
analysis.
m
9 At stage 3, uninformed consumers decide whether to request a risk analysis or not. 
Finally, at stage 4, all consumers decide whether and where to purchase an insurance policy.
10
Solving the game by backward induction, we start analyzing stage 4. Given the 
equilibrium price offers  , uninformed consumers who decided not to have a risk analysis 
performed by the middleman still choose their insurer at random. Furthermore, informed 
consumers buy their insurance policy at the “nearest” insurance company. Uninformed 
consumers prefer to become informed about their own risk profile, if 
f p








≤ ⇔ − − ≥ − − − . (13) 
If  , the middleman makes non-negative profits of  () t k 4 / 1 ≤ () (k m
f − − = φ κ 1. )
11 In 
this situation all uninformed consumers purchase the risk analysis and become informed about 
their own risk profile. In a situation where the performance of a risk analysis is not profitable 
and  () t k 4 1 >  holds, all uniformed consumers prefer to remain uniformed about their risk 
profile. Therefore, no intermediation takes place and the equilibrium results derived in section 
2 are unchanged. 
The profitability condition  ( )t k 4 / 1 ≤  has direct implications for the relevance of 
intermediation in different types of insurance markets. As the product space in our model is 
normalized to one, we cannot directly model different types of markets. Our model, however, 
                                                 
9 We do not consider any specific kind of explicit negotiations with any arbitrary allocation of bargaining power, 
because this would just imply a reallocation of rents between the middleman and insurance companies. 
10 Since in equilibrium all uninformed consumers either ask for the broker’s services or remain uninformed, 
other sequences have no impact on the qualitative results. The game could be reorganized without any loss of 
generality so that the broker offers the price for his service at stage 1, just before the insurers announce their 
premiums. 
11 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that uninformed consumers accept the offer, if they are indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting. 
  9still enables us to draw conclusions based upon specific characteristics of commercial versus 
individual insurance markets. Obviously, given the product space, different types of insurance 
markets can in our framework be characterized by the parameters k  and t. 
Real insurance markets’ structure suggests that intermediation tends to be more 
relevant in commercial and reinsurance than in non-commercial markets. This observation 
can also be explained in our framework. One could argue that the range of potential risk 
profiles in commercial markets is relatively larger than in non-commercial markets, implying 
that the disutility of mismatch, measured by t, ceteris paribus is greater in commercial 
markets. Although the costs of risk analyses k in commercial insurance markets are as well 
presumably greater than in non-commercial markets, intermediation becomes more profitable, 
if the relative increase in the disutility of mismatch exceeds the increase in the risk analyses 
costs. 
When the risk analysis performed by the middleman is profitable, eventually each 
consumer makes an informed decision. Using  1 = φ  and  t m 4 1 0 ≤ ≤
12, the analysis of 
section 2 leads directly to the equilibrium premium 
t c p
f + =  (14) 
and a resulting equilibrium profit of 
2
t f
j = π . (15) 
In a situation in which consumers pay the brokerage fees directly, the ex ante expected 
net utility of informed and uninformed consumers is given by 




− − =  (16) 
and 
                                                 
12 Again, a variation of m can be interpreted as a change in the allocation of bargaining power between the 
parties involved. 
  10m t c v u
f




The resulting overall welfare 
f Φ  in this situation equals the weighted sum of the ex 
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f κ and the 
insurance companies ∑
f
j π . 
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Rearranging (18) leads to 
() k t c v




Given that intermediation is profitable, and  ( )t k 4 / 1 ≤  holds, the lower bound for (19) 






− − ≥ Φ t c v
f φ
. (20) 
In this case, intermediation leads to an increase in welfare if and only if  . 
Thus, if intermediation is individually rational for uninformed consumers, it will also be 
profitable from a social planner’s point of view. However, a comparison of (
() t k 4 / 1 <
7) and (15) 
indicates that market intermediation by a middleman reduces the insurers’ profits. 
 
Commission system 
Turning towards the commission system, we will now address whether or not the latter 
result concerning the social profitability of intermediation remains the same. The analysis 
again is divided into two parts. First we assume that insurers cannot distinguish between the 
different groups of consumers and therefore offer their products at a uniform price. The 
second step will introduce the possibility of price discrimination, which gives insurance 
companies the opportunity to offer different prices for informed and uninformed consumers.  
  11For the analysis of the first case, we can directly use the results of section 2 and 
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Using the symmetry of the problem, one obtains the price level of 
() () ( ) t m c p t m c p
c + − + = ⇔ = + − − − − φ φ 1 0 1 . (23) 
and a resulting equilibrium profit of 
2
t c
j = π . (24) 
The result equals the one for the situation in which the insureds pay for the broker’s 
service. The only difference is a redistribution of income from informed to uninformed 
consumers since the latter only pay a fraction ( )m φ − 1  of the risk analysis fee. 
Now consider the case of price discrimination. The price for informed consumers 





i + = . (25) 
Uninformed consumers additionally pay for the broker’s services. The insurance 
companies maximize the premium offers subject to the restriction that the consumers’ net 
utility is not lower than in the case in which the broker is directly paid by the consumer. This 
condition is due to the fact that the broker would still be able to offer its services directly to 
the insureds who could subsequently purchase insurance at the price for informed consumers. 
The latter constraint directly leads to 
m t c p
d
u + + = . (26) 
  12Using the prices  ,   and assuming that the insurer pays the amount   to the broker, the 







j = π .
13 (27) 
Considering the analysis in this section, the presence of insurance brokers strengthens 
incentives of insurance companies to override competition in order to raise their profits
14. In 
the next section we will analyze these incentives and the impact of tacit collusion between 
insurance companies upon welfare and middlemen compensation. 
 
4. Intermediation and collusion 
In the previous section the middleman’s only function was to provide information for 
uninformed consumers. After information is revealed by the broker, consumers are able to 
find the best matching product by themselves. In order to introduce the possibility of 
collusion, we now extend the previous game structure by introducing a stage 0 where 
insurance companies bargain over explicit contracts. Insurers then present the middleman 
with a certain offer for his service. The minimum profits required by members of the coalition 




j ≥ π . (28) 
and 
0 ≥
tc κ  (29) 
                                                 
13 However, insurance companies may be able to increase their profits by only paying a fraction of   to the 
broker. Since the broker’s cost of risk analysis is 
m
m k < , the insurer’s maximum possible profit is 
() (k m
t d
j − − + = φ π 1
2
~ ) , which includes a redistribution of income from the broker to the insurance companies 
but has no effect on social welfare. Nevertheless, for the remainder of the analysis we will not consider such a 
situation. 
14 If insurance companies can decide upon their optimal product characteristics, product differentiation will, due 
to the increasing transparency on the consumer side, decrease compared to the situation without intermediation. 
However, profit-maximizing locations are still outside [0,1] (see SCHULTZ [2004] for further details). 
  13must hold. 
Condition (28) considers the fact that an insurance company’s individual profit under 






29) is due to the ability of the colluding insurers to exclude the broker from the 
market. If the broker offers a fee-for-advice service simultaneously, the sum of fee, insurance 
premium and costs of mismatch of an uninformed consumer would exceed his initial 
willingness to pay. 
From a cartel’s point of view two questions need to be answered: First, would the 
coalition benefit from a situation where every uninformed consumer acquires information and 
thus becomes an informed consumer? Secondly, is rationing beneficial, i.e. could it be 
preferable for the coalition to design the product in such a way that it would not be purchased 
by every consumer? 
 
Initial situation without rationing 
The straightforward approach for the coalition is to maximize their overall profit given 
the limited willingness to pay  . The decision problem regarding the risk analysis is 
unchanged compared to section 3. Therefore, irrespective of the payment arrangements for a 
broker’s service, the performance of risk analysis activities is profitable from the coalition’s 
point of view whenever 
v
t k 4
1 ≤  holds. The optimal arrangement must ensure that 
uninformed consumers purchase the risk analysis service. Moreover, after the risk analysis it 
must be individually rational for all types of consumers to purchase insurance coverage. 
The second constraint is only fulfilled if and only if consumers located at  2
1 = x  that 
face the maximum disutility of  t 2
1  would choose to purchase insurance coverage. The 
consumers’ participation constraint has a direct impact on the optimal design of payment 
arrangements. 
  14Again, the fee-for-advice and the commissions system need to be analyzed separately. 
At first glance, both payment structures seem to be payoff equivalent from the coalition’s 
point of view. However, this is not the case, as the following considerations clarify. 
 
Commission system 
In a commission system without rationing every uninformed consumer will purchase 
the product after receiving information regarding her risk profile from the broker, so long as 







This implies that insurance companies charge all consumers the maximum possible premium 
(30) and only remunerate the broker for services provided to the uninformed consumers. This 
leads to additional costs of () k φ − 1 . Thus, the overall profit for the coalition is 
() k t c v
tc φ − − − − = Π 1
2
1
.        (31) 
 
Fee-for-advice system 
Now, again, assume the situation where the broker is paid directly by uninformed 
consumers. Consequently, insurance companies are unable to distinguish between informed 
consumers and previously uninformed consumers. Hence, insurance can only be offered at a 
uniform premium  . The implementation of a fee   paid by uninformed consumers 
would lower the maximum feasible insurance premium for previously uninformed consumers. 
Therefore, insurance companies would have to reduce their premium offers for all consumers 
by   in order to guarantee participation by all types of consumers. The maximum feasible 
premium in a fee-for-advice system therefore is 
tc
f p k m ≥
m
                                                 
15 Price discrimination is not considered in the case of collusion. It is not beneficial for the insurers, as 
decreasing the premium for some consumers would just lead to lower profits. 
  15m t v p
tc




which leads to the coalitions overall profit 
() m k t c v
tc




A comparison of (31) and (32) reveals that the resulting loss for the coalition 
corresponds to  m ⋅ φ  (as the fee is only collected from initially uninformed consumers). 
Therefore, a payment regime where brokers are compensated by insurance companies is 
strictly preferable for the coalition.   
 
Rationing 
At this point, the possibility of rationing needs to be added to our analysis. The 
question is, whether or not it is more profitable for the insurers to increase prices in order to 
extract additional rents from some consumers, while others do no longer purchase insurance, 
as their willingness to pay is exceeded.  
It must be taken into account that a premium greater than the expression in (30) will 
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i  holds, rationing is profitable for the coalition. The marginal 









, 0 , ) 2 ( 2 x xt c v
x
r
i φ . (36) 
Thus, a necessary condition for rationing to be profitable is 
  16t c v + < . (37) 
Comparing (37) and (2) implies that rationing is never profitable. Thus, insurers’ 
coalition does not have any incentives to ration consumers by increasing their prices beyond 
 in order to raise overall profits. In particular the initial profit under collusion (31) can not 





In the light of recent events in commercial insurance markets, this paper considers collusion 
incentives and compensation structure for insurance brokers. In markets with uninformed 
consumers and heterogeneous risk profiles, intermediation has the potential to improve social 
welfare. However, since intermediation reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit 
collusion are higher compared to markets without intermediation. 
A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the 
issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides an explanation for the counterintuitive 
observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. As long as 
intermediation is profitable, it is irrelevant from a social welfare point of view whether 
brokers are paid by uninformed consumers or by insurance companies. From the insurers’ 
point of view, though, a system in which brokers are solely compensated by insurance 
companies is strictly preferable when the demand side consists of informed and uninformed 
consumers. The rationale for this is the fact that a fee paid by uninformed consumers limits 
the insurers’ opportunity to extract rents from both types of potential insureds. 
A limitation of our analysis is the fact that we do not examine the broker’s incentive 
problem. In our model the broker acts completely non-strategic. Particularly, every 
uninformed consumer is matched with the nearest supplier. However, in reality brokers may 
have incentives to mismatch uninformed consumers. For example, when commissions for 
different products vary and disutility of mismatching is non-verifiable, brokers are able to 
  17collect contingent commissions from suppliers for directing additional consumers to them. 
Contrasting our results, such a situation with strategic experts market intermediation may not 
necessarily lead to an increase of social welfare.
16
                                                 
16  See, e.g., DARBY AND KARNI [1973]; EMONS [1997]; WOLINSKY [1993]. 
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